Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Willemien Denner, a tralac Researcher, discusses trade policies and the global economic crisis: the Sub-Saharan Africa perspective.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) estimates that world trade will expand by 9.5 percent during 2010 as the global economy starts to recover from the global financial and economic crisis. Exports from developed countries are expected to increase by 7.5 percent and exports from the rest of the world, including developing countries, by 11 percent in value terms. Although it is expected that it will take another year before world trade values reach, and even surpass the high trade values recorded for 2008, the expected recovery is a significant improvement over the 12.2 percent decline in value terms and 23 percent decline in terms of US dollars recorded for world trade in 2009.

It has been determined that the sharp decline in trade values during the global recession has not been due to an increase in protectionist measures, but rather due to a major decline in global demand. This was exacerbated by the type of products for which demand fell and the fact that the decrease in demand happened across countries and regions. However, some countries implemented more trade restrictive than trade liberalising policy measures and African countries have implemented more post-financial crisis protectionist policies than China. Thus far discriminatory measures have remained the most prominent post-crisis policy response for most African trading partners in 2010.

The 5th Global Trade Alert Report focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa and argues that most African countries have been successful in resisting the temptation to implement protectionist policies, while many of their trading partners have implemented trade restrictive and distortive measures. These include various policies ranging from financial bailouts and export subsidies to government procurement and local content requirements. However, relatively developed African countries, like South Africa, have been able to retaliate against these measures.

Although many developed countries, like Japan and the United States implemented trade restrictive and distorting policies, many emerging countries like Brazil, China and India followed suit. For the G8 countries alone there are 226 trade restrictive measures indicated in the Global Trade Alert database. These measures affect 181 trading partners and 674 tariff lines. In comparison less developed countries implemented only 21 trade restrictive measures which affect 31 trading partners and only 15 sectors.

Some African countries have also implemented fiscal stimulus plans, following in the footsteps of their developed and emerging counterparts. In Mauritius the Government provided a stimulus package for the increase in domestic demand and job creation, while Nigeria provided bailouts for 5 banks. In South Africa the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) made loans available to distressed manufacturing sectors, including automotives and clothing and textiles while the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) made funds available to firms in different sectors and approved loans to various companies. Some countries did not have the necessary funds available to provide fiscal packages, rather focussing on the revision of their budgets to generate additional revenue or targeted assistance programs to support only those sectors of economic importance.

Of those trade policy measures which were implemented by African countries, most have been highly discriminatory with South Africa being one of the most protectionist African countries. 65 percent of the measures South Africa implemented during and after the financial crisis have been highly discriminatory policies. Other African countries which are relatively protectionist include Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Kenya. What is worrying is that Africa’s traditional trade partners implemented more discriminatory and less liberalising measures. Discriminatory measures were also applied by emerging African countries and other emerging trade partners like Brazil. This can disrupt the sustainability and the real and potential benefits for African countries from their trading relationships with traditional and emerging country trading partners.

The restrictive and protectionist policies which have been followed by most of Africa’s trading partners have indicated that African countries need to broaden their production and exports. African countries were mostly affected by those measures which discriminated against their agricultural commodities entering the markets of their trade partners and third countries. The continuation and increased production and exportation of primary commodities will intensify the competitiveness problems African countries are already experiencing, while building capacity and diversifying exports to higher value products will provide countries with policy space to adapt to the impact of a financial and economic crisis and improve negotiating power in their trading relationships.

Another important consideration for African countries is the need to reduce supply-side and cost constraints. These constraints limit the ability of African countries to participate in international trade by increasing the cost of production and thus worsening the competitiveness of African countries in the global market. To increase the competitiveness of African countries urgent attention needs to be paid to infrastructural deficiencies, including roads, railroads and electricity. A reduction in these constraints can decrease the cost of production which in turn will improve market access for African goods and services.

http://www.tralac.org/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=1694&news_id=87861&cat_id=1030

Source: WTO; 5th Global Trade Alert

US EXPORT COUNCIL PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO US COMPANIES SEEKING ACCESS TO HIGH GROWTH MARKETS OVERSEAS. http://usexportcouncil.com/

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

Rush reports to the district on his efforts to expand global energy and trade relations between the United States and the Gulf of Guinea

CHICAGO –– In a speech in Houston on Monday, U. S. Rep. Bobby L. Rush (D-IL) called on the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Executive Directors of the World Bank and the African Development Bank to support the establishment of Clean Energy Research Centers and Clean Energy Equipment Financing Facilities for the Gulf of Guinea.

Rush, along with other Members of Congress who represent Houston, U. S. Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee and U. S. Rep. Al Green, jointly expressed their support for clean energy technology research and equipment exports during a congressional briefing held at the Greater Houston Partnership in collaboration with the Woodrow Wilson Center on the subject “The Impact of U.S. Energy Policy on Trade with the Gulf of Guinea.”

Houston and Chicago were recently selected as two of four American cities to participate in the World Bank Group’s Public Sector Liaison Officer Network, an organization comprised of 100 business intermediary organizations, in 80 countries, working to foster trade and investment between participating countries with the support of the World Bank Group’s products and services.

The World Bank estimates that over 150 billion cubic meters of natural gas are flared or vented annually, an amount worth approximately $30.6 billion. This volume is an amount that is equivalent to 25 percent of the United States’ gas consumption or 30 percent of the European Union’s gas consumption per year. This flaring is highly concentrated in 10 countries that, together, account for 75 percent of global emissions, with the largest flaring operations occurring in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

The U.S. currently imports approximately 15 percent of its oil and gas supplies from West African countries along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. This level is expected to increase to 25% to 30% by 2020. The U.S. is also the largest importer of oil and gas from this region.
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While the U.S. pursues an energy policy that seeks to decrease its dependence on foreign oil and decrease its contribution to global warming, it is essential that the U.S. provide support to these key strategic partners to help reduce carbon emissions and gas flaring associated with meeting our market needs while alternative sources of energy are scaled up.

The proposal seeks to replicate a $37 million Department of Energy grant to China for research centers that was matched by the grantees, resulting in $75 million in total U.S. research. Under the proposed U.S.–Gulf of Guinea Clean Energy Research Center project, the U.S. Department of Energy will provide grants to regional universities and technology centers, with matching funds from the grantee or the host country, and the African Development Bank. The research will focus on advancing technologies for building energy efficiency, carbon capture and storage, and clean energy/anti-flaring/pollution control, biomass and other alternative energy solutions.

The Members of Congress who participated in the forum have encouraged the Obama Administration to include this initiative in the U.S.-Nigeria as well as in the U.S.-Angola Bi-National Commission discussions.

Congressman Rush joined Chris Wilmot, Chairman of the Greater Houston Partnership’s World Bank Task Force, in calling on Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, to establish financing facilities for clean energy projects in the Gulf of Guinea that can be complimented with financing from OPIC, EXIM and the African Development Bank. These recommendations also encourage these financial institutions which receive U.S. government funding to include minority firms.

Congressman Rush also expressed his support for the establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Energy Fund. The emergence of this fund was in response to new, local content laws in the region and recommendations outlined in a 2005 Congressional Black Caucus Foundation Report that called for the establishment of new financing facilities and joint ventures between major oil companies and indigenous companies with a particular emphasis on including U.S., minority-owned firms.

The briefing was held on the first day of the Offshore Technology Conference, an event designed to engage leading government and industry representatives from Africa as well as senior executives from U.S. oil companies to help develop legislation supporting U.S. trade and energy policy toward the Gulf of Guinea region in West Africa.


US EXPORT COUNCIL PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO US COMPANIES SEEKING ACCESS TO HIGH GROWTH MARKETS OVERSEAS. http://usexportcouncil.com/

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Former Obama Adviser John Podesta

John Podesta, 61, was White House chief of staff under President Bill Clinton and headed Barack Obama's transition team. He talks to SPIEGEL about Obama's health care reform, the new president's track record during his first year in office and what's plaguing the American political system.

SPIEGEL: Barack Obama has finally managed to push his health care bill through Congress. But can it still be considered a success after the endless debates? Some Democrats are afraid of a disaster at the midterm elections in November because many Americans are skeptical about the reform proposal.

John Podesta: It will cover more than 30 million people with health insurance. We're spending more than 17 percent of our GDP on providing health care, and yet we don't have health outcomes that are anywhere near commensurate with that, particularly compared to European systems. So it is definitely a success.

SPIEGEL: The final bill, however, is very different from Obama's initial proposals. Cost-cutting in the health care sector is no longer a priority, and more competition for the insurance companies won't be introduced.

Podesta: It is certainly better for the Democrats to get something done even if this involved compromises. They have been fighting for better health care coverage for decades, and this bill is a very significant step. Let's also remember that some of the effects of this bill will be immediate. Right now, young people just entering the job market have the highest rate of unemployment. That means they don't have health insurance. Because of this bill, their families will be able to include them on their policies. The president and members of Congress will be heading out and explaining the benefits and I think the more people hear and understand about the bill, the more they will see how remarkable it is.

SPIEGEL: Not a single Republican sees it that way, though. It's a stark contrast to big social reforms in the 1960s, such as Medicare or Medicaid.

Podesta: I don't think you can say that the president did not try as hard as he could to engage Republicans -- and let's remember that the final legislation had over 200 Republican amendments included. But, at the end of the day, the Republicans were unwilling to help, and he was not going to let them prevent him from fulfilling his commitment. There is no doubt that the Republicans will campaign against the bill but, in doing so, they risk becoming simply the party of no.

SPIEGEL: Wasn't that predictable, though? As Bill Clinton's former chief of staff, you know how contentious health care debates can get -- and how fierce Republican resistance can be.

Podesta: Obama was trying to at least reach out to Republicans. But they pulled back again. That surprised him.

SPIEGEL: Many people have a different theory. This president is still popular personally, they argue, but members of Congress don't seem to be willing to follow him.

Podesta: I think that's natural. I saw similar things when I worked for President Clinton. President Bush had success with his party when he was asking them to do easy things. If you walk up to Capitol Hill and say "Please cut everyone's taxes," they'll be very happy to oblige you.

SPIEGEL: Do you think that Obama was too detached in the health care reform process?

Podesta: Quite the contrary: He got too entwined in these negotiations. So the story was all about the sausage-making and not about what he was trying to deliver and how it fit in with the other things he was trying to get done. The public lost a sense of what the big story was. He stopped making the case to the country about how his different reform elements fit together.

SPIEGEL: So he was more of a prime minister than a president?

Podesta: He has got to stop being the prime minister. Obama needs to project the strong power he has as the US president and use his cabinet more effectively.

SPIEGEL: Was it a mistake for Obama to go for the "Big Bang," to try several big reforms simultaneously in his first year?

Podesta: No. The analysis he proceeded from was that unless you could get these strong foundations by attending to the things that needed reform in the US economy, you couldn't have strong sustainable growth. What perhaps surprised the people in the White House was how long the health care debate took and how little real support there was from the Republican Party.

'Obama Already Has a Lot of Authority'

SPIEGEL: Why is it so hard for the Democrats to get their act together? The majorities, in a way, are there. But we are seeing a lot of infighting within the Democratic Party.

Podesta: Obama represents the mainstream of the Democratic Party; there are outliers on both the left and the center-right. And the US process is one of persuasion rather than a parliamentary discipline that comes in a European system. He has got to convince the members of Congress. They're independent actors. They run for election and reelection on their own.

SPIEGEL: What are some of the lessons Obama could draw from the Clinton years? He could face a drubbing in the midterm elections similar to the one Bill Clinton experienced in 1994.

Podesta: He will lose seats but not Congress. However, my advice for him is: Work all the levers of your power. Don't just view your job as working with Capitol Hill to pass legislation. There are 2 million people who work for the president of the United States. Look at clean energy: It needs legislation, but Obama already has a lot of authority to do things that he could be doing. And I think that's what Clinton did. He did it when he had Democrats in power. He did it when we had Republicans in power.

SPIEGEL: Could the lessons include firing staff at the White House? There is much talk right now about the divide between pragmatists, such as his chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, who want to get things done and idealists, such as chief strategist David Axelrod, who would like to preserve the message of change.

Podesta: We can agree on one thing: The White House staff is overexposed. I don't think we need any more profiles of any more staff people. I don't think that helps the president, and I think they know that as well. I think the president still has confidence in his team. I would be surprised if, at this moment, he shook the staff up in a substantial way.

SPIEGEL: But is there a real divide at the White House between idealists and pragmatists?

Podesta: There are people like Rahm Emanuel, who -- by style, by temperament, by experience -- is focused on getting things done. Some of the other people who campaigned with the president are encouraging him more to not compromise on the things that he ran on. But, ultimately, these are the president's decisions.

SPIEGEL: Many Americans feel that Washington is "broken." They see standstill in institutions like the Senate. Does the US need to have a debate about the American political system?

Podesta: What we now have is essentially a parliamentary system in which every vote is a vote of no confidence, with no majority rule. That's not a prescription for good governance. It is the result of use and misuse of the filibuster, the instrument to stop any debate with 41 votes in the Senate. (Editor's note: For debate on a measure before the US Senate to be closed, thereby allowing a vote on it to take place, three-fifths of the senators -- usually 60 of 100 senators -- need to call for the debate to be closed. If the minority party has 41 or more senators, it can delay or prevent a vote by extending the debate indefinitely in a so-called filibuster.)

SPIEGEL: That hasn't always been the case.

Podesta: I spent the earlier part of my career working in the Senate and, at that time, filibusters were rare. They were used for issues that senators felt were really aimed at fundamental constitutional principles -- like civil rights. They happened, but when people actually filibustered, they stayed in the Senate around the clock and debated.

SPIEGEL: Now senators simply announce their intention to file for a filibuster, which is often enough of a threat to block legislation.

Podesta: That's why it is now used on virtually everything that comes to the floor of the Senate, including even the ability to confirm people to serve in public office. Nominees for key positions in government are being held up with threats of filibusters, and I think that is dysfunctional. In the middle of the financial crisis, Obama could not appoint the leading civil servants in the Treasury Department for more than a year because of such opposition.

SPIEGEL: Has the partisanship in Washington gotten worse since the Clinton years?

Podesta: It's worse today than it was then. We were able to get some things done with bipartisan support.

SPIEGEL: Why is that?

Podesta: Because of the redistricting of our constituencies, the most partisan representatives now tend to occupy large chunks of districts, particularly in the House of Representatives. Another factor is the "permanent campaign" most parliamentarians need to engage in now. The influence of money is also to blame, as well as the polarization of the media. The Americans in the middle are desperately looking for somebody to fix the system. They have shifted back and forth in recent elections because they're so frustrated with the incapacity of government in Washington.

'There's Too Much Money in Politics'

SPIEGEL: New groupings, such as the Tea Party movement, thrive on that. They are against big government above all else. Right after the financial crisis, government seemed to be more popular in the US. A Newsweek cover read: "We Are All Socialists Now." That feeling has evaporated quickly. Why?

Podesta: I don't think the American public was ever in favor of a kind of social democracy on a Scandinavian scale. What surprises and disappoints me was that the failure of markets and the failure to regulate the financial system have not been internalized by the public. They don't seem to have realized that the counterpoint to the greed and excess that those markets produced is a strong government.

SPIEGEL: Has that been internalized by the White House? We can see the massive influence of money in Washington. How willing is Obama to attack the system?

Podesta: Obama has been willing to attack it. But his message gets confused because, even in attacking the system, you have to create a basic level of financial stability, so that the whole economy doesn't go over the cliff. The public saw that all the bailout money went to the very firms that created the mess. It confused them. But the question is: Did we have a different option?

SPIEGEL: Many Americans, though, feel bitter that money also buys access in Washington. Well-connected industry groups shower politicians in Washington with billions of dollars each year.

Podesta: We've been after this for 30 years, and it just gets worse and worse. Obama put in very strong ethical provisions to try to push out the influence of lobbyists. But, today, on health care, on financial regulatory reform, the lobbying business is still a growth business.

SPIEGEL: How would you discuss that with your own brother Tony, who runs a very successful lobbying firm here in Washington?

Podesta: He does what he does. I think there's too much money in politics -- and the influence of lobbyists -- and this need for raising tremendous amounts of money through special interests in order to run campaigns -- is corrosive.

SPIEGEL: Let's look at foreign policy. Many observers say Obama has been even less effective on the global stage than at home.

Podesta: I disagree. He established quite a good record, particularly for a first-year president. He took a difficult decision in Afghanistan. He kept support for that amongst his NATO allies. He got the Pakistani government more aligned to go after certain elements of al-Qaida and the Taliban in Pakistan and used drones in the region efficiently to hunt down terrorists. The pressure to increase sanctions on Iran is an ongoing process, but it's still one that he's played intelligently.

SPIEGEL: But there is a lack of any progress in crucial areas like the Middle East.

Podesta: True. Obama's effort there has not produced anything that looks like it's got a coherent, end-game, positive result associated with it.

SPIEGEL: And he has no genuine friends among global leaders in spite of his popularity abroad. He does not seem to care about building close relationships.

Podesta: His style is certainly different from George W. Bush, who wanted to be liked and really developed deep personal relationships. But if you have the wrong foreign policy and good personal relations, you end up with bad results. And if you have the right foreign policy, a strong team to implement it, and thinner personal relations, you're more likely to have very good results.

SPIEGEL: Europeans were also dismayed that Obama did not push for more progress on climate change at last December's summit in Copenhagen.

Podesta: I'm a glass half-full guy when it comes to climate change.

SPIEGEL: How so?

Podesta: The dialogue running up to Copenhagen, particularly on the European side, was sort of unrealistic. It didn't align by largely working off the fulcrum of Kyoto. The Copenhagen framework aligned the global system and led to the emergence of sort of basic negotiation means. It will allow the big developing countries to participate in a clean energy reduction strategy. You did have substantial commitments made by China, by India, by Brazil, by Indonesia in advance of Copenhagen. They're on board.

SPIEGEL: But the US, with its huge emissions output, still needs to lead.

Podesta: Global progress depends on the United States' continuing to make progress on reducing its emissions. That ultimately requires legislation to pass the Senate.

SPIEGEL: That means a change to the famous American way of life. In the current political environment, is it possible to ask Americans to make sacrifices? The numbers supporting climate change legislation are dropping.

Podesta: That's not true. The numbers who think that climate change is a top priority problem and even the numbers who think that climate change is caused by human activity are dropping. But the support for strong intervention to change the way we consume and use energy and move to a clean energy future hasn't changed. You use the word "sacrifice." I use the word "opportunity."

Interview conducted by Gregor Peter Schmitz

URL:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,686218,00.html

Tuesday, March 30, 2010

President Obama outlines strategy to boost US exports -- and jobs

President Obama moved Thursday to create a high-level team to promote US exports, with the goal of creating 2 million jobs within the next five years.

The project will span from efforts to reduce hurdles for companies in shipping goods overseas, to adjusting trade policy with a blend of carrots (a push for new free-trade agreements) and sticks (tougher enforcement of trade rules). The near-term goal is to double US exports within five years.

"For the first time, the United States of America is launching a single, comprehensive strategy to promote American exports," Mr. Obama told the annual conference of the Export-Import Bank, an institution in Washington designed to promote US trade.

Getting that many more jobs from exports won't be easy, but new efforts on trade are very much needed, economists say. The most obvious reason is that America needs more jobs, at a time when consumer demand at home remains tepid. A second reason is that the world economy continues to become more competitive, which means that the US can't rest on its laurels as the world’s leading exporter of goods and services.

"Ninety-five percent of the world’s customers and the world’s fastest-growing markets are outside our borders. We need to compete for those customers. Because other nations are," Obama said. "We need to up our game."

Obama outlined a multipart "national export initiative":

• He signed an executive order "instructing the federal government to use every available federal resource" to boost exports. The order created an "export promotion cabinet," made up of the secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, plus the US trade representative and other officials.

• He revived a separate body, called the President’s Export Council, and named Boeing CEO Jim McNerney and Xerox CEO Ursula Burns as co-chairs. The panel will make recommendations on trade policy.

• Multiple cabinet departments will help create a "one-stop shop" for small employers that want help identifying opportunities and setting up operations overseas. The effort would include embassies and consulates abroad, as well as agencies like the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce.

• Obama pledged to promote new free-trade agreements while also enforcing laws on the books, such as intellectual-property rights. "China moving to a more market-oriented exchange rate would make an essential contribution" to a more-balanced global economy, he said. That move could also help narrow the large gap by which US imports exceed exports.

• The administration will increase access to trade financing. Obama commended efforts by the Export-Import Bank over the past year to step up its activities when US credit markets were impaired.

In addition, Obama pledged to be a kind of salesman in chief for US companies, with him and his cabinet members plugging the virtues of "made in America" when they travel overseas. Next week, the president will take his export evangelism to Indonesia and Australia.

The announcement about export strategy came as a government report showed a narrower-than-expected trade deficit for the US in January. Imports exceeded exports by $37.3 billion, with the volume of oil and automobile imports falling for the month.

Obama first announced the goal of doubling exports within five years during his State of the Union address to Congress in January.

Some economists, running the numbers, have said it's a difficult objective to reach.

"During the last 25 years nominal exports never grew this quickly in five years; it took an average of 11 years for exports to double," economist Sven Jari Stehn wrote in an analysis for Goldman Sachs.

Hitting the goal, he estimated, would require a combination of strong global economic growth and an adjustment of the dollar's value relative to currencies such as China's yuan.

"If global real GDP grew by an above-consensus 4.5 percent during the next five years, the dollar would still need to depreciate by about 30 percent, slightly more than the largest 5-year real depreciation on record during the last 25 years," Mr. Stehn concluded.

This doesn't mean that Obama's target is unreachable, however. And efforts to boost exports and achieve a more-balanced global economy could bring benefits even if his goal isn't reached.

By Mark Trumbull, Staff writer / March 11, 2010 The Christian Science Monitor

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

SENATOR TED KENNEDY MEMORIAL LECTURE - Pretoria, South Africa

SENATOR TED KENNEDY MEMORIAL LECTURE

New Beginnings, Enduring Challenges:

American Foreign Policy to Africa from Kennedy to Obama

Witney W. Schneidman

University of Pretoria

Pretoria, South Africa

October 27, 2009

Fifty three days ago, a lion among us, Senator Ted Kennedy, was buried in Arlington National Cemetery close to his beloved brothers, President John F. Kennedy and Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

With Ted Kennedy's passing, everyone one in the world lost a champion of democracy, a crusader for human rights and a passionate defender of dignity.

In his eulogy, President Barack Obama compared Senator Kennedy to the "Happy Warrior" that the British poet, William Wordsworth, spoke of when he wrote:

As tempted more; more able to endure,
As more exposed to suffering and distress;
Thence, also, more alive to tenderness.

Senator Kennedy's reach was enormous. Whether it was health care for all, opposing futile wars, making it possible for collegiate women to have resources in sports equal to men, or ensuring equality for the handicapped, the Senator touched the lives of all Americans in a way that few have.

Following the death of Bobby Kennedy, he eulogized his brother with three lapidary phrases that resonate today, and aptly describe Teddy himself: "he saw wrong and tried to right it, he saw suffering and tried to heal it, he saw war and tried to stop it."

An outsized personality and a beacon for liberal passions, Ted Kennedy embodied the famous adage--that you can accomplish anything you want if you do not care who gets the credit, and, as a result, he is duly credited for making our nation a better nation, and this world a better world.

As a legislative deal maker, the Senator was exceptional. There is the famous story of how he won the support of a Texas Committee Chairman on an immigration bill. Senator Kennedy walked into the meeting with a plain manila envelope, and showed only the Chairman that it was filled with the Texan's favorite cigars. When the negotiations were going well, he would inch the envelope closer to the Chairman. When they stalled, he would pull it back. Before long, the deal was done.

Ted Kennedy understood Africa.

At the urging of his brother, Jack, he first visited the continent in 1956 after graduating from Harvard to gain insight into the African countries emerging from European rule, traveling to Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

It was in Algeria, that he encountered the certainty of French colonial rule and, after being in Algiers, understood that it was no match for the determination of the Algerian independence movement.

Ted returned to Africa five years later, weeks after President Kennedy took office, visiting the Congo, Rhodesia, Ghana, Guinea and elsewhere.

Senator Kennedy's commitment to ending apartheid, therefore, came from his understanding of the reality of decolonization in Africa.

And this is why, as President Mandela said after his death, Ted Kennedy "made his voice heard in the struggle against apartheid at a time when the freedom struggle was not supported in the West."

Kennedy's inspired campaign against apartheid included a protest at the gates of Pollsmor prison in defiance of the South African police where he demanded Mandela's release.

Kennedy was a fierce champion in the U.S. Senate of what became the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, signed into law on this day, October 27th, 23 years ago.

In short, Senator Kennedy reflected the outrage of many Americans who saw apartheid as an affront to humankind.

But Ted was not the first Kennedy to connect with this remarkable nation.

On June 6th 1966, speaking to a gathering of the National Union of South African Students on the Day of Affirmation at the University of Cape Town, Ted's brother, Bobby Kennedy, then the junior Senator from New York, gave what many consider the greatest speech of his extraordinary life.

Saluting the courage of many South Africans who opposed apartheid, and reassuring them that they indeed had friends in the outside world, Kennedy said:

"It is from numberless diverse acts of courage and belief that human history is shaped. Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million different centers of energy and daring, those ripples build a current which can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance.

Kennedy Africa Policy

The American poet, David Whyte, in his poem, "Working Together," writes:

We shape ourself to fit this world / and by the world are shaped again.

And so it is with a nation's foreign policy, and American policy toward Africa is no exception.

In the next 30 minutes, I will endeavor to convey the outlines of American policy toward Africa from Kennedy to Obama, with a focus on Southern Africa, and will close with some observations about what to expect from this administration.

Now if some of you are asking yourselves, how long did he say he was going to speak, let me assure you that I aspire to reflect the positive aspect of the observation made by Mark Twain, that it is "wise men who speak because they have something to say; fools speak because they have to say something."

When President Kennedy was sworn into office on January 20th, 1961, he inherited a world that was a battleground between extremes of the right and left, between democracy and totalitarianism, extinction and survival.

For Kennedy, this battle was most acute in the developing world, the Third World, where nationalism, which he recognized as consistent with the values of democracy, was being threatened by the prospect of communist subversion.

Following a trip through strife-torn Asia in 1951, Kennedy remarked that nationalism "is the most important international fact of life in the second half of the twentieth century."

Therefore, Kennedy concluded, the United States could no longer afford to buttress the "inequitable status quo" of colonialism. The nationalist era had to be acknowledged and engaged.

At the same time, the United States had interests in Africa and elsewhere, especially security and commercial interests, which some argued demanded caution and continuity in policy.

This dichotomy, between nationalism and anti-communism, defined the contours of American policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War.

Breaking the Mold?

The first months of the Kennedy Administration did indeed see a break from the past.

At the United Nations, the Administration voted against Portugal's ongoing colonial rule and extended material and political support to Frelimo in Mozambique and the FNLA in Angola.

At the same time, there were those in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the bureaucracy who believed Portuguese threats to deny refueling rights for American military aircraft on the Azores in the mid-Atlantic, thereby weakening America's capability to protect Western Europe, and lobbied against engaging the new order in Africa.

As the author Richard Mahoney puts it, policy in the Kennedy Administration was defined by a trade off of Africa versus the Azores.

As for South Africa, some policymakers argued strenuously that the country made a valuable contribution to Western security. After all, South Africa had allowed the U.S. to establish a deep space military tracking station near Pretoria.

Ultimately, the Kennedy Administration suspended all arms sales to Pretoria but decided not to support African efforts to expel South Africa from the United Nations.

By the time of President Kennedy's death on November 22, 1963, it was apparent that the problems of Southern Africa would not be resolved easily or quickly.

When presented with a resolution in the General Assembly in the summer of 1963 that would increase pressure on Portugal and South Africa, Kennedy asked his advisers how the French would vote.

When he was told that they would "seek the best of both worlds," he said "let us try that this time."

Kennedy understood intuitively the observation of the British philosopher, Edmund Burke, who said that, "Not the least of the acts of statesmanship is gracefully to grant what eventually cannot be withheld."

Nevertheless, his decision to seek the best of both worlds ensured a policy defined by ambiguity.

The objectives of enhancing U.S. security and supporting self-determination in Africa were both served, albeit imperfectly.

Still, the administration did not abandon either objective.

The Johnson Conundrum

African issues intruded early into the Johnson presidency.

The unprecedented ten-nation African tour by China's prime-minister, Chou En-Lai, in December 1963, and his comment that Africa was "ripe for revolution" transfixed many in Washington who increasingly viewed Africa as a great prize in the growing competition for global influence among the U.S., the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Nevertheless, Johnson, preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and turmoil at home, paid little sustained attention to the continent.

While the U.S. did impose sanctions on Rhodesia, Johnson took no position on the rapid rise of American investment in South Africa.

The net effect, by the end of the Johnson administration, was to virtually extinguish what had been a raging debate in the American foreign policy establishment between regionalists versus globalists, Africanists versus Europeanists, security interests versus support for decolonization, largely in support of the status quo.

In January 1968, Vice President Hubert Humphrey made a nine-nation visit to Africa in a belated effort to show America's commitment to the continent's well being.

In a speech in Lusaka, he criticized Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa for turning "their faces from the inevitable triumph of self-determination," as he put it. Unfortunately, the U.S. government seemed to be doing the same.

Nixon's Retreat

For Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, their most immediate task was to extract the U.S. from Vietnam and to ensure that the nation was not easily drawn into future conflicts in Third World trouble spots, or what they described as "peripheral" areas.

A central component of the Administration's diplomatic strategy was the policy of détente, which linked increased cooperation with the Soviet Union to Moscow's agreement not to seek unilateral gains in the developing world.

Another dimension to Nixon's global security strategy was the opening of relations with the People's Republic of China.

As Kissinger would write in his memoirs, he hoped that the U.S.-China rapprochement would act as a further brake on Soviet ambitions in the Third World.

Policy toward Southern Africa was codified early in the Nixon Administration with the issuance of National Security Decision Memorandum 39. The key paragraph stated:

"The Whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can through selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies…"

Morality aside, key elements of this analysis proved profoundly wrong when on April 25th 1974, the Armed Forces Movement, led by General Antonio de Spinola, toppled the dictatorship in Lisbon setting the scene for a rapid end to 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule in Southern Africa.

And as the Administration was soon to find out, the incentives provided to the Soviet Union through détente were no deterrent to Moscow's decision to increase its influence in Southern Africa.

The "peripheral" area of Angola quickly became the focal point for a renewed scramble for influence in Africa.

With a fortuitous sense of timing, the Chinese chose this moment to exit Angola, wisely declining to pick sides in this increasingly violent transition.

The Cold War conflict in Angola escalated quickly.

The U.S. initiated a covert operation, that didn't stay covert for very long, with the assistance of South Africa. Cuba made the decision to deploy 20,000 troops, and a vicious deadly proxy war broke out.

Ultimately, international and domestic criticism compelled Washington to back off its support of South Africa, and Congress cut funding for the CIA's effort to wage war in Angola.

On November 11, 1975, the MPLA declared Angola's independence.

The U.S. would not normalize relations with the Angolan government for the next 18 years.

The Soweto uprising, on June 16, 1976, further portrayed Henry Kissinger and his boss, President Gerald Ford, as unable to impact, let alone positively influence, the course of events in what appeared to be an increasingly complex and unsettled region of the world.

It was against this backdrop that I began to learn about Africa.

My first defining experience on the continent was in Uganda where I was on January 21, 1971, when Idi Amin staged a successful coup d'etat.

Shortly, thereafter when I started to study the 20 countries I had visited in my year traveling after high school, I realized that America was in the minority of nations that had stable, predictable political transitions.

In much of the world, it seemed that if change occurred at all, it was often sudden and chaotic.

And in Africa, the countries were very young, and in Southern Africa, struggling for independence or majority rule.

This mix of people, politics and geography captured my imagination at an early age and compelled me to set my personal compass on U.S.-African relations as a career, and to do what I can to advance a positive agenda.

The Carter Interregnum

So naturally, I resonated with President Carter's ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, who stated in January 1977 that the new administration would have "a very aggressive policy to move towards majority rule in Southern Africa."

And in sharp distinction to the Nixon-Kissinger approach, Carter stated: "We have based our policies on the belief that the peaceful transfer of power to the black majority is not only necessary and desirable but possible."

Like previous administrations, the Carter team struggled to come up with the right calculus of pressures and incentives to move Pretoria toward majority rule.

A principal instrument became U.S. support for the Sullivan Principles. These principles, developed by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, an individual whose legacy I work to extend at the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation in Washington, compelled American companies in South Africa to end segregation in the workplace and provide training and other opportunities for black workers.

By the end of the Carter administration, there was a sense that little had been accomplished.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Richard Moose, noted in 1980 that "change" had taken place in South Africa, but that it would be a mistake to "interpret the difference as progress."

Constructive Engagement

With Ronald Reagan assuming the presidency in 1980, the United States once again shifted its gears.

As Princeton Lyman, a former U.S. ambassador to South Africa, writes in his book, "Partner to History," "two giant forces, destined to clash," were at work in shaping American policy toward South and Southern Africa.

One force, put in play by the Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs, Chester Crocker, was the policy of constructive engagement that linked the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to Namibia's independence, and offered improved relations with Pretoria for its cooperation with this plan.

The other force was the growing strength of the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. that linked civil rights leaders, student protesters and local government activism into a major national campaign.

Reagan's indifference to majority rule and growing domestic strife in South Africa, appearing on American televisions every evening, fueled the anti-apartheid movement in the United States.

Starting in November 1984 when Randall Robinson and three others were arrested for refusing to leave the office of the South African ambassador in Washington, more than three thousand Americans would be arrested in front of the South African embassy.

Within several years, nineteen states, sixty-eight cities and one hundred and nineteen colleges and universities had imposed some sort of sanctions or pressure on South Africa and American companies doing business there.

By the time Crocker left the State Department, after the election of George H.W. Bush, Southern Africa was changed forever.

First, the Cold War was over, and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, had stated explicitly that the problems of Southern Africa could not be solved through military force. As well, Cuba withdrew its forces from Angola, Namibia was on the verge of independence, and South Africa ended its long and very costly destabilization of Mozambique.

Once again, America's historic objectives in Southern Africa of advancing self-determination and majority rule while limiting the advance of communist governments had been imperfectly served, to say the least.

It fell to Congress and civil society in America to intensify pressure on Pretoria, largely through economic sanctions, while the Reagan administration served a more narrow, but vital, set of interests.

By now, I have ignored the advice of Benjamin Disraeli: be amusing, never tell unkind stories; above all, never tell long ones. But there is an important point to this story for which I would like to think the noted British prime minister would make allowance.

Clinton and Africa

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of South's Africa's transition to democracy, American policy to Africa under President Clinton searched for new direction.

That search reflected the story of the famously absent-minded Albert Einstein who once boarded a train and was asked by the conductor for his ticket. After fumbling in his pockets for several minutes, the conductor said he would arrange for his passage to be paid, to which Einstein replied, "it is not the cost I am worried about, I need to be reminded about where it is that I am going."

And so it was with Clinton Africa policy.

The new president inherited a humanitarian mission in Somalia that quickly turned into a searing foreign policy disaster when, in October 1993, two American black hawk helicopters were shot down and the bodies of 16 American soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu as the world watched on CNN.

Caution toward Africa led Washington to stand by a year later as more than 800,000 people perished in genocide in Rwanda. This inaction created one of Bill Clinton's deepest regrets as president, as he would subsequently declare and apologize for.

However, in that same year, 1994, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, led a trade mission to South Africa and Botswana in which he signaled for the first time that the U.S. had legitimate commercial interests on the continent.

Ron Brown's commercial diplomacy toward Africa reflected important changes taking place across the continent, notably the emergence of civil society, democratic governance and economic reform.

In fact, President Clinton's unprecedented 12-day 6-nation African visit in 1998, in which I participated in my capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was designed to highlight these positive trends which, in the intervening years, have come largely to define this continent.

At the same time, the Clinton Administration and the new ANC government in South Africa had little knowledge of each other and, in fact, eyed each other warily in key areas.

To address these concerns, Washington and Pretoria made the important decision to create the Gore-Mbeki Bi-National Commission in an effort to foster a greater understanding of each other's objectives and to shape American support for South Africa.

We worked hard in the Clinton Administration to build on the success of the BNC, and this led to the creation of the U.S.-Angola Bilateral Consultative Commission, the U.S.-SADC Forum, and the U.S.-Nigeria Economic Cooperation Commission in an effort to deepen America's understanding and support for the process of economic and political reform.

One of the most important accomplishment of this era was President Clinton's signing into law of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

AGOA acknowledged that by providing African nations with enhanced access to the American market, trade would become a stimulus to economic development. Moreover, it codified what Ron Brown had understood, that trade and investment are a cornerstone of U.S.-African relations.

AGOA also forged a bipartisan consensus in Congress, which is still very much alive today, based on the recognition that it is in America's national interest to invest resources in Africa's development.

With the deadly attack by al-Qaeda on the American embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and the robust effort to end the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, the shape of America's post-Cold War approach toward Africa began to take form: the U.S. had enduring security interests on the continent, conflict resolution was a priority but so was enhancing democracy and commercial ties through trade, investment and development assistance.

The question remained, as always, how should the U.S. balance competing objectives to advance its interests while supporting key African goals.

Bush's War on Terror

When the United States was again attacked by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, universal condemnation—and support for America--was instant and virtually uniform from NATO to the African Union and around the world.

Yet as soon as President Bush declared, "if you are not with us, you are against us," it became apparent that the United States was prepared to act unilaterally in what the White House saw as a new global confrontation between good and evil, survival and annihilation.

In what quickly became defined as a "global war on terror," the Bush Administration attacked and overthrew the Taliban in Afghanistan, and 18 months later invaded Iraq,

Within months, American foreign policy was dominated by the draining consequences of a seemingly endless war in a remote country. At the same time, the war on terror, condemned by much of the world's public opinion, increasingly took on the menacing overtones of a collision with the world of Islam.

As the American national security adviser, Zbigniew Brezinski, wrote, "nemesis nips at the heels of hubris."[1]

Accordingly, expectations for Bush in Africa were quite low, but in fact, he surpassed the expectations of many, including myself--evoking the African proverb: don't insult the crocodile until you cross the water.

President Bush made a major effort to end the north-south civil war in the Sudan, and identified the violence in Darfur as genocide. He extended and improved AGOA twice. He also created the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and, later, the President's Anti-Malaria Initiative.

Even though its diplomatic roll out was poorly communicated, the creation of the U.S. Africa Command also belongs in this group of important policy innovations toward Africa.

For sure, key conflicts went unresolved during the Bush Administration, especially in Darfur, Somalia, the eastern DRC, Zimbabwe and the Niger Delta. Nevertheless, Africa is likely to be the most positive aspect of the Bush foreign policy legacy.

Obama Takes Over

Looking back at the broad sweep of American policy toward Africa, I draw several conclusions.

In both the post-colonial and post-Cold War eras, Washington has faced an enduring challenge of balancing and integrating the complex of American policy objectives so that the U.S. and the vast majority of nations on this continent can advance a common agenda.

The challenge is not about regionalists versus globalists, or Africanists versus Europeanists, it is about developing a policy that is coherent, sustainable and achieves mutual goals.

Clearly, some administrations have done better at this than others.

Second, aligning U.S. priorities with Africa's priorities, be it self-determination in the 1960s or strong governance and accelerated economic development today, can be extremely challenging but it is essential that we both try, and succeed, if the U.S. and Africa are to advance their many common interests.

Finally, it is apparent that if the U.S. focuses its attention only on governments, and neglects engagement with the broader elements of African society, such as parliaments, universities, women's organizations, entrepreneurs and other members of civil society, American policy on the continent will never realize its full potential, and this will also be a constraint on Africa's progress.

So what are the prospects for the Obama administration's policy toward Africa?

Perhaps most importantly, I would argue that Obama's global security agenda is one that most African governments support.

As the president stated many times throughout the campaign and since taking office, "the security and well being of Americans is inextricably linked to the security and well being of people elsewhere."

And as he said in his inaugural address, "we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals."

Be it environmental degradation caused by climate change, attacks on innocent civilians by religious extremists, the threat posed by nuclear weapons, disease, or people who do not have enough to eat, the United States cannot afford inaction when the fabric of nations and regions threatens to unravel.

This does not mean that the United States can, or will, or, indeed, believes it ever could, solve every problem. To the contrary.

As President Obama said at the United Nations last month, the U.S. expects help from others in addressing global security issues.

As he put it: "Those who used to chastise America for acting alone, cannot stand by and wait for America to solve the world's problems alone. (The Obama administration) has sought…a new era of engagement with the world. Now is the time for all of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response to global challenges."

With regard to Africa, there has never been an American president as knowledgeable of this continent as Barack Obama, given his Kenyan heritage.

But the President isn't alone. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, my former boss, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, and my former colleague, the Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, among others, bring an extraordinary depth of experience, insight and commitment to their task of shaping American policy toward Africa.

For these individuals, and many others in the American government, at the core of the American agenda in Africa is good and effective governance, accountability and transparency.

As President Obama said in Cairo in June and Accra in July: "each nation gives life to democracy in its own way, and in line with its own traditions. But history offers a clear verdict: Governments that respect the will of their own people, that govern by consent and not coercion, are more prosperous, they are more stable, and more successful than governments that do not. And this is not just about holding elections. It is also about what happens between elections."

In addition to governance, the Obama administration is committed to ending ongoing conflicts, food security, energy security, taking steps to protect Africa against the negative consequences of climate change, promoting renewable sources of energy, supporting the Millennium Development Goals in an effort to eradicate extreme poverty and enhanced trade and investment.

Not only is President Obama committed to doubling double foreign assistance by 2014, he has already announced a $3.5 billion food security initiative, as part of a larger G8 program.

On her seven-nation tour in August, Secretary Clinton gave more definition to the U.S. agenda in Africa. In addition to the issues already mentioned, the Secretary underscored the need to make AGOA more effective, to end sexual violence against women especially in the eastern DRC, and to put relations between South Africa and the United States on a stronger and more productive footing—something that is already paying dividends under the very able leadership of Ambassador Gips and his colleagues in the South African government.

Against this backdrop, it is worth noting how President Obama envisions his legacy in Africa.

In an interview with allAfrica.com prior to his Ghana visit, Obama echoed Winston Churchill's observation that "Continuous effort - not strength or intelligence - is the key to unlocking our potential."

As the president put it: "I would like, at the end of my term in office, to be able to say that the United States was an effective partner with countries throughout Africa in building the kinds of institutions--political, civil, economic--that allowed for improved standards of living and greater security for the people of Africa; that we moved them on a trajectory in which they are integrating with the global economy; and that a young person growing up in Johannesburg or Lagos or Nairobi or Djibouti can say to themselves, I can stay here in Africa, I can stay in my country and succeed, and through my success, my country and my people will get stronger."

This perspective is reflected in a recent article by President Paul Kagame of Rwanda who wrote: "Africa and the United States may be on the verge of a new partnership, not one of dependency and aid but one of shared ideas, vision and investments that increase our mutual prosperities."

So, it's fair to ask, will we get there?

I recently read the poem, "Behold Mama, Flowers," by the distinguished South African poet, Dr. Mongane Wally Serote, and there is a verse that says:

what will happen now memories keep coming back and the future is a wall scrawled with the graffiti of my memories what will happen now even as I wave the truth away as if it were smoke coming to my eyes my sight knows

And it is that sight, that vision, which Ted Kennedy spoke of shortly before he died, when he said: "I hope for an America where we can all contend freely and vigorously, but where we will treasure and guard those standards of civility which alone make this nation safe for both democracy and diversity."

Be assured that Senator Kennedy wanted the same for every nation on this great continent.

At the same time, he, like President Obama, would say that it is up to each of us to make this happen because, as Senator Kennedy said time and again in his signature phrase: "…the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives and the dream shall never die…"

Thank you.


[1] Zbigniew Brezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, (New York: Basic Books, 2007)

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