20 April 2009
I have deliberately called this the Zuma election rather than the South African election, because that is what it has all been about. The only real issues in this election have turned on Zuma and these have been issues that he brought to the campaign. This has been the case right down to the last 12 days before polling when Helen Zille’s Democratic Alliance trumpeted the slogan “Stop Zuma”. And former president FW de Klerk issued a public statement calling on voters to avoid giving the ANC a two-thirds majority.
SOME POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES
This was an election organised and run very smoothly to the credit of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The sorting out initially of the parties, the handling of candidate lists, and the registration of voters has been impressive. Particularly impressive is the record number of new and young voters who registered. The IEC also deftly handled any complaints it received.
Another positive in this election has been the way the media has played it. Yes, newspapers have a right to take up positions – whether in respect to particular parties or in respect to issues. But their reportage has been comprehensive and their commentary fair.
A positive in this election has been confirmation of the constitutional right of South Africans living abroad to vote in general elections - provided they are registered. The fact that the South African embassy in London was the biggest polling booth in the whole election (involving more than 7 000 voters) testifies to the interest South Africans abroad have in the well-being and politics of their country. Obviously, next time round there will be many more such voters, given that the right to vote has been established.
Another positive is the fact that the election has changed the political landscape. The emergence of COPE, which reflects essentially the growing black middle-class, is a major factor in terms of future politics – however disappointingly COPE may perform in the election itself. Related to this is that the election had a strong moral focus – given the fact that it revolved around Zuma and the charges against him. The country needed an awakening in this regard and I think it got it.
But there were also negatives.
There is the question of campaign financing. The ANC had more money than it knew what to do with. Some examples. The Financial Mail in its pre-election issue says that the ANC ordered around 2 million T-shirts ahead of the polls. (It had 300 000 printed prior to the 2004 election.) The DA has printed 150 000 at about R20/shirt. If the ANC pays the same rate, it will have spent R40 million on campaign T-shirts alone! Its posters in and around Gauteng (Johannesburg) were held in permanent plastic and steel holders actually bolted to lamp posts – unlike other political parties with their cardboard and string efforts. And then there is the ANC’s fleet of 4x4’s which ferried officials, candidates and voters around the country. One suspects that all of this cost much more than the publicised donations which the ANC received from certain businesspeople. Mathews Phosa, at a breakfast meeting in Cape Town last week, was asked about the need for campaign fun ding reform. At the same time, the questioner put it to Phosa that the ANC had received funding from Libya and/or China. He replied to the general question but didn’t respond to the question of where the ANC got its campaign funding from. There is a strong suspicion, actually voiced by certain columnists, that the ANC campaign certainly received funding from China – which was the reason for the extraordinary decision to refuse a visa to the Dalai Lama.
Another negative was the lack of any real political debate or real discussion of what one might describe as “the bread and butter” issues. This was because Zuma, and the issues surrounding him, dominated this election to the exclusion of most other things.
But the biggest negative was the dominant role played in this election by Jacob Zuma. For example, I don’t recall a single commentator comparing the kind of leadership which, say, Sam Shilowa or Helen Zille could bring to a new government. To make comparisons along these lines would simply have been unreal – given on the one hand the certainty that the ANC would have a majority and on the other hand Zuma’s individual personal domination and central role in the election.
It was a foregone conclusion that the ANC would win the election – the only big question was by what margin and whether it would gain a two-thirds majority. But overshadowing everything else of importance was Jacob Zuma, the ANC’s presidential candidate. I can’t think of a parliamentary election (as opposed to a presidential election) in which an individual has played so dominant a role.
There were three reasons for this. Firstly, there was the passionate commitment of his supporters – a passion fuelled by Thabo Mbeki’s actual perceived mistreatment of Zuma. Secondly, the fact that Jacob Zuma as a personality in this election, with all the baggage he brought, his more vocal and irresponsible supporters, his own often scary statements, the questionable release of Schabir Shaik and his legal manoeuvrings around the criminal charges against him was a highly controversial and divisive figure.
Something of the flavour of this was conveyed by Diana Geddes, who wrote the cover story on the election for the most recent Economist. In an interview on Fine Music Radio of Cape Town, she initially raved about Zuma as a personality. She played down his lack of formal education, spoke of his enormous energy and his ability to relate to people, even referring to his excellent voice. In fact, she was so upbeat that interviewer Lindsey Williams remarked that she seemed to be a fan!
But when it came to his public statements and positions, Geddes expressed concern at what sort of president Zuma would be. She gave as an example a statement which he made in February about ANC members who joined COPE. “They will find it cold outside the ANC – very cold.” She said there was something ominous about this.
The third reason for Zuma’s dominance of this election campaign ironically is the fact that he personally was the soft underbelly of the ANC – something all the other parties instinctively understood and tried to exploit. The hope was that somehow – whether imposed from outside or self-inflicted, Zuma would blow up and derail the ANC’s campaign.
This was everybody outside of the ANC’s hope, and Helen Zille therefore was being completely consistent when, after the NPA dropped charges against Zuma, she took the decision on judicial review. She was similarly being consistent when she trumpeted right at the end of the campaign the “Stop Zuma” slogan.
Nothing here suggests that Zuma will not make a good, even great, president. All polities at different stages require a particular leadership. Right now, after Mbeki and all the uncertainties, we need a return to Mandela’s reconciliation and consensual style of leadership. Zuma, as Geddes suggests, may be the person.
But given Jacob Zuma's overwhelmingly dominant role in this election, and the controversies surrounding him, much depends on how he reacts after the election. No doubt he will make overtures to South Africans in general and to minorities in particular - as he did to Afrikaners during the campaign. But the purge that started after Polokwane in December is likely only to deepen after the election. This is unfortunate as it means some excellent people will be pushed to the margins. The counterpart to this, of course, is that it places a heavy responsibility on those who stayed on in the ANC and supported Zuma and who have a sense of responsibility in relation to the country, its economy and all the people of South Africa. A heavy onus rests on people like Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Mathews Phosa to ensure that the ANC remains accountable to all South Africans.
WHAT WILL THE OUTCOME BE?
The last survey conducted in March by Ipsos Markinor, from all accounts the country’s most reliable survey, in rounded figures gave the:
- ANC – 65%
- Democratic Alliance – 11%
- Congress of People (COPE) – 9%
- Inkatha Freedom Party – 3%
- Independent Democrats – 1%
- United Democratic Movement - 0.7%
- African Christian Democratic Party – 0.6%
- Freedom Front (FF+) – 0.6%
On the question of a two-thirds majority, the latest poll shows the ANC possibly between 64% - 66%, with opposition parties collectively mustering 26% - 28%, with 9% of voters still undecided.
Alister Sparks, veteran analyst whose opinion I respect, puts the numbers as follows:
- ANC – between 60% and 65%
- Democratic Alliance (DA) – between 12% and 15%
- COPE – between 8% and 10%
Spark expects the DA to show the most improvement – a view with which I agree.
Of some importance is the fact that the opposition parties apparently have already agreed on a cooperative and combined opposition strategy. In terms of the Electoral Act, there can’t be any mergers, as this would mean that the party merging would lose its seats. But the need to cooperate is apparently acknowledged by all parties who gain some representation.
To be specific, I will chance the following:
- ANC - 62%
- Democratic Alliance - 13.5%
- COPE - 8.8%
- Inkatha Freedom Party - 2.5%
- Independent Democrats - 1.2%
Of the minnows, the Freedom Front will do better than most people anticipate.
Dr Denis Worrall
Email: kamreyac@omegainvest.co.za for all enquiries
Copyright 2009. Omega Investment Research. All Rights Reserved
www.omegainvest.co.za
