Showing posts with label sovereign wealth funds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sovereign wealth funds. Show all posts

Saturday, November 29, 2008

It is oil that protects the Gulf countries from sliding into a worldwide recession

Less than a year ago, the world was scrutinizing and even rejecting investments by the Gulf countries' sovereign wealth funds (SWF) into the West. Last month, by contrast, US and European governments and major companies flirted with sheikhs, emirs and senior officials from the Gulf, in a desperate bid for them to inject more money into their own ailing budgets.

Leaders from the UK to the US have arrived in the Gulf in recent weeks asking oil exporters to pour more cash into their firms and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which only weeks ago was busy imposing transparency conditions on SWFs. Large investment banks are fishing for opportunities in the region, with Merrill Lynch saying last month it wanted to open an office in Kuwait in addition to its branch in Dubai. Banks such as Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse are already running or expanding operations in the Gulf. And it doesn't end there. Investment bankers from Wall Street to London are sending their impressive CVs to companies in the Gulf as Western banks make major layoffs to survive the worst financial crisis in 80 years.

This change of heart is justified by the so far oblivious resilience of the oil-rich Gulf economies to the repercussions of the global financial meltdown. But are they really that resilient, and if so, how long can they keep up their stamina? On the face of it, the Gulf countries are better placed than most countries in the world, thanks to the petrodollar surpluses they were able to accumulate through the oil industry's more bullish days. The price of oil skyrocketed to $150 through the year ending July. And knowing that Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, account for more than half of OPEC's official production quota of 28.8 million barrels per day (BPD), one can imagine how huge their oil revenues were. However, with oil contributing 80 per cent of their public revenues, the 60 per cent decline in oil prices to reach $55 per barrel earlier this week draws many question marks on the claimed resilience of these economies.

The IMF's quarterly economic Outlook, released at the end of September, expected that most Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members would achieve moderate growth next year, with the exception of Qatar with its GDP rising from 16.8 per cent this year to a whooping 21.4 per cent next year, thanks to gas exports. However, these optimistic expectations are outdated as the outlook was prepared before the end of September and is based on an average oil price of $107.25 a barrel for 2008 and $100.5 a barrel for 2009. Oil prices are now moving between $55 and $58. The oil revenues of the six Gulf countries -- namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab of Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain -- reached $700 billion in 2007.

A less optimistic report was the GCC Economic and Strategy Report for the fourth quarter of 2008, released by leading Islamic investment bank Gulf Finance House. It reads that together with the declining oil prices, foreign capital outflows reached $7 billion since the beginning of 2008 in the case of Dubai -- and a retreat in the demand on industrial and building materials in the construction industry, the second main driver of the economy after oil, will slow down the growth of GCC members.

Simon Williams, head of research for emerging markets department of HSBC Dubai, seconds the report, predicting that the average growth rate of the countries in question would decline to under five per cent in 2009, from seven to 7.2 per cent through 2008, provided that oil prices stay put around $60 per barrel, otherwise the rate will be much lower.

Adding to the gravity of the situation are the steep declines in all bourses since the beginning of the year on the back of the break- up of the subprime crisis. The total value of shares listed on stock markets in the Gulf region plummeted by $250 billion in October as indices sank by an average of 25 per cent amid the global financial meltdown. A mild upturn at the end of the month did little to counteract the earlier rout and markets in the oil-rich states ended October worth $720 billion, an enormous $400 billion less than at the start of the year.

What will help mitigate the impact of the crisis, according to the report, is if governments of the region continue their robust spending. According to a Reuters dispatch on the infrastructure spending in the region, there are more than $2 trillion worth of expansion projects under construction in the world's biggest oil-exporting region.

All in all analysts see the crisis as a mixed blessing. Top economists participating in a Reuters summit held in the first week of November agreed that global financial turmoil "could weed out property and bourse speculators looking for a quick buck and help curb spiralling inflation." Inflation in the region has hit the double digits and property prices in Dubai were red hot before the crisis, with residential property prices soaring by 42 per cent in the first quarter alone.

With most Gulf states maintaining their currency pegged to the US dollar, Gulf states and private investors with cash positions have realized gains from the greenback's recent jumps against major international currencies. However, this will not last long, according to Williams, who believes that the dollar will be losing ground against most currencies soon.

Rich with cash, Gulf investors find in the meltdown an opportunity to make good bargains. For example, Kuwait's Noor Financial Investment is looking into equity buys in Asia and the Middle East to take advantage of lower assets prices and wants to set up a $1 billion opportunity fund or special situations funds, to invest in stocks whose current market prices no longer represent the real value and long-term potential of the firms.

Author: srazek@ahram.org.eg http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/924/ec3.htm

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Wednesday, November 26, 2008

Sovereign wealth funds switch from Western investments

Sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf are switching their focus away from Western stock markets to shore up ailing economies in the Middle East and protect themselves from losses in the City and on Wall Street.

Investment funds in Kuwait, Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi are understood to be changing their investment strategies after losing billions of dollars buying shares in Western companies. Several Gulf-based banks are being propped up with state investment. Local stock markets have collapsed and some funds are shifting their assets into local shares in an attempt to inject confidence.

The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) has shifted $4 billion (£2.6 billion) from Western markets into its own bourse and the Qatar Investment Authority has begun a bailout of local banks. Dubai International Capital (DIC) is concentrating on emerging markets and rumours have spread that the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, a $700 billion oil fund, is retreating to local markets.

Sovereign wealth funds are among the few sources of liquid capital available worldwide and many companies have sought cash injections from the Middle East. However, investments in banks such as Citigroup and Merrill Lynch have cost the funds dearly and regional bankers are said to feel that they were lured into investing before the full extent of the crisis was known. The KIA, which has assets estimated at $250 billion, said two months ago that it had lost $270 million on a $3 billion investment in Citigroup, which was made at the beginning of this year. Citigroup's share price has fallen by two thirds since that announcement and now the bank is being supported by the US Government.

The ruling families of Qatar and Abu Dhabi agreed last month to inject £6 billion into Barclays, giving the Gulf-based investors a 30 per cent stake. However, this sort of bailout may become more difficult as funds are diverted to the Middle East.

A refocusing by the funds on local and emerging markets is worrying for Western politicians. Gordon Brown visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Abu Dhabi this month to encourage sovereign funds to invest in British businesses and also support international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in an attempt to limit the economic downturn.

Sameer al-Ansari, chief executive of DIC, said yesterday that he saw opportunities in Western markets in the next couple of years, but admitted he was unlikely to take any big bets soon.

“Timing is going to be absolutely crucial, but I am still not comfortable with the kind of big bets we have taken traditionally,” he said. “Given the crisis that we are in, the governments in the region have to use their money wisely. That means investing in infrastructure and long-term projects good for the region and also to look outside [the region] to diversify, acquire, to buy strategic assets.”

DIC, which owns the Travelodge chain of hotels, is thought to have suffered a fall in the value of its assets from a peak of $13 billion to between $10 billion and $12 billion.

DIC is the investment business of Dubai Holdings, a government-owned conglomerate that includes property companies, ports, banks and hotels. It has large stakes in Sony, EADS, HSBC and Daimler. The fund is said to have effectively ended private equity investments and has ruled out making another approach for Liverpool Football Club, having lost out to the American investors Tom Hicks and George Gillett last year.

Speaking at the Dubai International Financial Centre conference yesterday, Mr al-Ansari said that falling stock prices in the West could provide some Gulf countries with an opportunity to develop their own economies. Investing in technology and manufacturing companies would allow these states to encourage operations to be moved to the Gulf, which would provide jobs for the region's rapidly growing population. “To become the largest shareholders in the ten largest companies in the world would cost about $50 billion at present and that's actually not a lot of money,” he said. “Imagine the power and influence this region would have if we were the shareholders in the ten, twenty, thirty largest companies in the world.”

Author: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article5233278.ece

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Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu on Sovereign Wealth Funds

Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu has issued a new point of view (POV) on the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) for Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), a set of voluntary principles agreed to by the International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds on 2 September 2008.

The 24 Principles, known informally as the "Santiago Principles" after the city in which the IWG drafted the final version of the GAPP, offer guidelines covering governance, accountability, transparency, and conduct of investments for SWFs. The 26 SWFs that make up the Principles include permanent observers from Oman, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, the OECD, and the World Bank.

The Deloitte POV provides:
A brief history on the development of SWFs
A summary of the circumstances leading to the creation of the Principles
The text of the Principles
An initial assessment of their quality and potential impact.

The Santiago Principles mark a significant milestone in rationalizing the integration of SWFs into the global capital markets. A robust implementation of the GAPP should go far towards resolving questions about the transparency, accountability, and operations of SWFs. SWF adoption and implementation of the principles should also provide Deloitte member firms with significant opportunities to expand their relationships with existing or prospective clients in this sector.

Minding the GAPP (2720 KB) PDF download
Published 11 November 2008; 20 pages; A Financial Services guide.
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,cid%3D233332,00.html

US EXPORT COUNCIL PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO US COMPANIES SEEKING ACCESS TO HIGH GROWTH MARKETS OVERSEAS. http://usexportcouncil.com/

Tuesday, October 28, 2008

Sovereign Wealth Funds; Potential Strategic Tools for Regional Stability and Social Cohesion?

The opportunities for more cross-border GCC investments within the MENA region itself, as well as other emerging market regions, could be a good strategic response to the growing scrutiny over SWF investment in Western markets, says Alessandro Bruno.

The Case of the Middle East and the Growing Shiite-Sunni Rift

Investment Thesis:

True “sustainable” investment has at least three dimensions: economic, environmental, and social. With the conspicuous exception of Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have paid relatively little attention to the latter two dimensions. We believe that the embrace of Sustainable Investment (SI) approaches by the SWFs, particularly those in the Persian Gulf region, could pay important economic, social, environmental and even political dividends.

More specifically, SWFs in the Persian Gulf region should consider making strategic, cross-border investments which are explicitly targeted at job-creation and economic and social development within the region. Historically, major SWF investments have tended to be either global or purely domestic. A third, mid-range category of SWF investments holds considerable promise: cross-border, intra-regional investments with a strong job-creation and social development focus.

Such investments could go a considerable distance towards mitigating the Sunni-Shiite conflict, thereby helping create a more stable and attractive investment climate in the region. This would not only benefit the overall investment programs of the SWFs themselves, but also those of Western investors. The latter impact would also have the collateral benefit of creating new reputation capital for the Gulf SWFs, and potentially mitigate some of the suspicion with which they are currently viewed by the West.

Background and Context:

Sovereign Wealth Funds have been one of the hottest topics in both financial and political circles since early 2007. While the definition of SWFs remains somewhat imprecise and even controversial, they are frequently defined as funds controlled by governments invested in international securities against which the government does not have any liabilities. This differentiates them from other government-controlled investment entities such as public pension funds.

Following the surge in the price of oil, most oil-rich countries, which are especially concentrated in the Middle East, have accrued significant amounts of foreign reserve surpluses. Consequently, the scale, risk appetite and impact of SWFs have all increased exponentially over the past few years. In the face of the credit crisis and the bail-out of several major western banks by SWFs, they have been praised especially by financial actors, as forces of financial stability and saviors for troubled banks. Among the Western financial institutions which received life-saving financial transfusions from SWFs in 2007 are: UBS, Citibank, Barclays, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. Table 1 below summarizes the investable asset bases of four of the largest SWFs in the Gulf region:

At the same time, however, major multilateral institutions such as the OECD and the IMF, as well as the international investment community, have also shown increasing concern about the real or potential lack of independence of SWF operations from government policies, and the possibility of “politically motivated” investments by SWFs. The International Monetary Fund is currently drafting a code of conduct for SWFs (Generally Accepted Principles and Practices), which will primarily focus on the transparency and independence of their governance structures and behavior.

In this short Issue Brief for Innovest clients, we shall argue that, while “political” investments in the western capital markets might not be desired by the Western investment community and regulatory bodies, in other regions such as the Middle East, strategically-targeted, “political” cross-investments between countries can be a source of both political and economic stability in the region. This would actually benefit most of the stakeholders in those jurisdictions, as well as Western investors and corporates.

The Global Trend Towards Sustainable Investment

There is a powerful, worldwide trend among major institutional investors to incorporate “sustainability” or “ESG” (environmental, social, and governance) concerns – notably climate change – into their global investment strategies. Recent evidence indicates that, in addition to other less tangible benefits, risk-adjusted returns can also be improved by including sustainability factors.

By far the most far-reaching aspect of this trend has been its rapid recent growth beyond the narrow “socially responsible investment” niche into the mainstream investment world. Among the most recent examples of this “mainstreaming” phenomenon:

• Over 380 leading global financial institutions, with more than $55 trillion worth of managed assets, have formally expressed strong concern about climate change as an investment risk through the global Carbon Disclosure Project.

• Over 400 major institutional investors, with over $15 trillion in assets, have recently pledged formally to integrate sustainability considerations more directly into their investment strategies by publicly adopting the UN Principles for Responsible Investment.

• Over 20 institutions from seven countries, with over $2.4 trillion in combined assets, have already invested in investment research in this area through the Enhanced Analytics Initiative.

To date, however, with the conspicuous exception of Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, the world’s SWF’s have been conspicuous by their absence from participation in this global trend. This may be an ideal opportunity to change that.

The Potential Stabilizing Role of the GCC SWFs

The urgency of subduing the Shiite-Sunni quarrel at both regional and domestic levels is such that in Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah has risked his own legitimacy, challenging the dogmatic Wahabi clerics. The emerging sectarian struggle in an area holding most of the world’s known oil reserves is a grave geo-political and economic concern. However, as worthwhile as the interfaith dialogue recently launched by Saudi Arabia could be, it must also be buttressed by investment and economic growth.

Significant political and economic changes have recently swept across the Persian Gulf countries. The princes of the Gulf have taken small but symbolic steps to suggest that they are trying to earn greater legitimacy with their populations, including the election of women parliamentarians in Saudi Arabia and semi-democratic elections in Kuwait. The economic changes, particularly as far as capital markets are concerned, have been even more significant. Many Gulf countries and companies are now open to foreign investment. Saudi Arabia has embarked on a privatization process, and the smaller princedoms of the UAE and Bahrain have made attracting foreign investment one of their main priorities. Libya has also adopted market reforms easing foreign investment, opening up to trade and removing domestic barriers to resource allocation. This suggests that economic cross-connections driven by SWFs could be increasingly effective policy tools which could contribute to political stability and sustainable economic growth in such historically volatile regions.

Even at an oil price of “only” USD 70/barrel, the Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) can expect unprecedented revenue (into the trillions of dollars) over the next decade. This gives them extraordinary investment clout abroad. It also gives the GCC a powerful investment opportunity, which has a real chance to affect the very nature of the region’s economy and society, by promoting diversification away from oil, as well as social transformation through the employment and training of locals in a greater variety of industries. In other words, the GCC SWFs’ investment philosophy will have significant worldwide and regional repercussions.

While their domestic investment has focused largely on improving hard physical and industrial infrastructure, outbound foreign investment has concentrated on gaining a foothold in the world’s principal capital markets and targeted industries such as aerospace, real estate and high technology. The GCC sovereign funds have, however, paid less attention to emerging markets, particularly those that share their same language, customs, and culture in the Middle East and North Africa. One of the main problems afflicting the region, in spite of the various pockets of intense oil-derived wealth, is youth unemployment. Left unchecked, it remains the primary destabilizing element in the region, because of its vulnerability to ideological and potentially violent forms of social protest, which often take on religious hues in the MENA region. The tensions that linger from the Iraq war and the Lebanese political crisis, combined with the hegemonic challenge posed by Iran in the region, can only grow as destabilizing ingredients. Characteristically, governments remain the largest employers in the region. The GCC’s sovereign funds should not simply seek to replace the state in offering essential services; they should consider investing to help support emerging private sector companies, so as to reduce the employment burden on the state itself. Abu Dhabi is already using private capital to finance water and power projects, and the model could be exported and supported through SWF’s.

Sovereign funds may prove to be the ideal tool to catalyze a greater diversification of the region’s economy, based on private rather than public sector leadership, carrying with it the promise of an improvement of living standards for the entire population of the MENA region. The SWFs have at least five major advantages denied to virtually all other major institutional investors:

- Exponential growth rates

- An infinitely long investment horizon

- An extremely broad vested interest in the overall health of entire national economies and societies

- A lack of financial liabilities to offset their revenues

- A very short, efficient decision chain

These unique assets provide a unique set of capabilities which could and should, we believe, achieve much wider objectives and benefits than is currently the case.

Some Early Progress

One ambitious example of what we have in mind is Saudi Arabia’s planned USD 6 billion SWF to finance domestic projects designed to maximize employment and training in general, and youth employment in particular. This provides an excellent and recent example of a domestic initiative which could be replicated and scaled up on a regional basis. The opportunities for more cross-border GCC investments within the MENA region itself, as well as other emerging market regions, could be a good strategic response to the growing scrutiny over SWF investment in Western markets. The Western ambivalence and occasional antipathy towards sovereign funds in the GCC region militate in favor of more of this kind of “South-South” cooperation. Not surprisingly, Libya's USD 100 billion sovereign fund is primarily targeting investment in other emerging market areas such as Asia and South America. It should be encouraged to seek opportunities in the emerging markets of the Middle East as well.

Kuwait has already used its sovereign wealth fund to make a cross-border strategic investment in Syria. The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) has discussed launching a joint venture investment fund with the Syrian government to invest in Syria, which has continued to open its economy to foreign investment over the past decade despite the imposition of US sanctions. A Kuwaiti-Syrian holding already owns 10% of the Damascus Four Seasons hotel, which has been very profitable. In addition, in June 2008, it was also announced that Syria and Qatar set up a venture with share capital of $500 million to invest in property in Syria. The concrete prospects of peace with Israel are expected to boost market reforms in Syria even further.

Having historically been focused on either purely domestic or international investments, Gulf States now increasingly realize the investment opportunity to help develop the Muslim world, to overcome the sectarian rift, and to invest in the economic, social, and environmental infrastructure necessary for the region’s economic growth.

In the environmental sphere, Abu Dhabi’s USD 15 billion+ commitment to the ambitious MASDAR environmental technology initiative (including the creation of the world’s first carbon-neutral city) provides a compelling example of what can be accomplished with a “sustainability-enhanced” investment orientation. While MASDAR currently has a domestic focus, it could ultimately become an engine of technological development, employment, and forward-looking skills development for the entire region. On the social side of the sustainability ledger, in neighboring Dubai, investments improving the living standards of international workers could help minimize labor problems and bottlenecks which could otherwise threaten the emirate’s spectacular growth boom.

Conclusion

In the face of continued political crises in the Middle East, the GCC sovereign wealth funds and their oil revenues can play a significant political and economic stabilizing role in the region. We would advocate that the Gulf SWFs pursue three bottom lines (economic, environmental, and social) with their investment strategies, expanding their almost exclusive focus on only the first of the three. Such investments could decrease the overall investment risk profile of the region, and increase the scale and scope of the economic opportunities, for Gulf and Western investors alike.

Consequently, we believe that the attempts by western transnational institutions such as IMF and OECD to depoliticize the SWFs and to transform SWFs into pure economic players are not fully justified, and might deprive the investment community from the stabilizing roles that such funds could play in their own regions.

Any regulatory pressure on the SWFs by Western regulators and multilaterals, while attempting to depoliticize their investments in the international capital markets, should also permit or ideally encourage SWFs to make investments aimed at increased stability and long term economic, social and environmental progress in their home regions.

Alessandro Bruno is Research Analyst at Innovest Strategic Value Advisors.

US EXPORT COUNCIL PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO US COMPANIES SEEKING ACCESS TO HIGH GROWTH MARKETS OVERSEAS. http://usexportcouncil.com/

Sunday, October 12, 2008

The 24 "Santiago Principles" - The International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds

The International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds has released its Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP), also known as the Santiago Principles.

At the Ministerial Meeting of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG), held on October 11, 2008, Mr. JoaquĆ­n Almunia, European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, made the following statement:

"Let me first congratulate the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the IMF for the major effort they have made to complete the Generally Agreed Principles and Practices (GAPP).

"When the IMFC and the G7 last April asked the IMF and the OECD respectively to prepare a set of best practices for SWFs and principles for recipient countries, it was difficult to imagine that so much would be accomplished in less than one year.

"The principles and practices of the GAPP amount to a global public good that can help foster trust and confidence between sovereign wealth funds, their originating countries, and the recipient countries. This is what we need in these turbulent times: a strong commitment to enhance mutual trust and maintain and preserve an open investment environment.

"The European Commission has pleaded from the very beginning for a cooperative and multilateral solution. In February 2008, the Commission issued a Communication on a common European approach to sovereign wealth funds. There we stated that: "Europe must remain committed to its tradition of openness to capital investments, as they are a vital source of strength for the European economies in a globalised world."

"There we made the case for engaging SWFs in a cooperative effort to enhance their governance standards and the quality of information they provide to markets in the mutual interest of both recipient and sponsor countries.

"I am very pleased to see that this approach is now generally accepted by both originating and recipient countries of the funds, and it is part of the cooperative philosophy that has produced the GAPP.

"I believe that reaching an agreement on a common European approach to sovereign wealth funds at an early stage was particularly important for the success of the process that produced the GAPP. In fact: (1) it pre-empted uncoordinated national actions by European countries with respect to sovereign wealth funds, and (2) it provided to originating countries the reassurance that they would continue to find in the EU a clear, predictable, and reliable legal environment for their investments, with the European Commission playing its full role in enforcing the European Treaty provisions on free movement of capital and openness.

"I think that the GAPP rewards all those of us who recognised from the beginning that sovereign wealth funds represent a major source of investment for recipient economies and that, as long-term investors, they will continue to bring benefits to global financial markets.

"Sovereign wealth funds, that today are a powerful class of investors in global finance, also needed to dispel concerns in recipient countries, through commitments towards higher transparency, better governance and greater accountability. All the more so given that the growth of SWFs is often the result of persistent imbalances in the global economy. Such imbalances need to be addressed with appropriate policy actions by originating countries of the sovereign wealth funds.

"I believe that by individually implementing the set of generally accepted principles and practices voluntarily agreed, and that are presented here today, SWFs will prove that they are responsible and reliable players in the global financial system.

"The European Union acknowledged from the start that the process of confidence building should not be one-sided and that recipient countries have also to take firm commitments. This is why we support the work of the OECD aimed at identifying best practice guidelines for recipient countries. Such work is in progress and we expect that it will provide greater predictability for sovereign fund investors and reassure that foreign investments are welcomed in our economies.

"With regard to the follow up, we strongly support the proposal contained in the GAPP to create a standing group of Sovereign Wealth Funds that would keep the GAPP under review, monitor its implementation, and continue the dialogue with recipient countries. I see the usefulness and importance of this group, in particular if it will continue to operate in a multilateral framework and provide a platform for a strengthened dialogue with recipient countries. The Commission remains committed to support the work of this standing group, and to facilitate the debate and continue to promote a common European approach."

In furtherance of the "Objective and Purpose", the IWG members either have implemented or intend to implement the following principles and practices, on a voluntary basis, each of which is subject to home country laws, regulations, requirements and obligations. This paragraph is an integral part of the GAPP.

  • GAPP 1. Principle
    The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).
    • GAPP 1.1 Subprinciple The legal framework for the SWF should ensure the legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.
    • GAPP 1.2 Subprinciple The key features of the SWF's legal basis and structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and the other state bodies, should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 2. Principle
    The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 3. Principle
    Where the SWF's activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies.
  • GAPP 4. Principle There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements in relation to the SWF's general approach to funding, withdrawal, and spending operations.
    • GAPP 4.1 Subprinciple The source of SWF funding should be publicly disclosed.
    • GAPP 4.2 Subprinciple The general approach to withdrawals from the SWF and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 5. Principle
    The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where appropriate in macroeconomic data sets.
  • GAPP 6. Principle
    The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF to pursue its objectives.
  • GAPP 7. Principle
    The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and exercise oversight over the SWF's operations.
  • GAPP 8. Principle
    The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its functions.
  • GAPP 9. Principle
    The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined responsibilities.
  • GAPP 10. Principle
    The accountability framework for the SWF's operations should be clearly defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement.
  • GAPP 11. Principle
    An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF's operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards in a consistent manner.
  • GAPP 12. Principle
    The SWF's operations and financial statements should be audited annually in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in a consistent manner.
  • GAPP 13. Principle
    Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made known to the members of the SWF's governing body(ies), management, and staff.
  • GAPP 14. Principle
    Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF's operational management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and follow clear rules and procedures.
  • GAPP 15. Principle
    SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate.
  • GAPP 16. Principle
    The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which the SWF's management is operationally independent from the owner, should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 17. Principle
    Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries.
  • GAPP 18. Principle
    The SWF's investment policy should be clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio management principles.
    • GAPP 18.1 Subprinciple The investment policy should guide the SWF's financial risk exposures and the possible use of leverage.
    • GAPP 18.2 Subprinciple The investment policy should address the extent to which internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of their activities and authority, and the process by which they are selected and their performance monitored.
    • GAPP 18.3 Subprinciple A description of the investment policy of the SWF should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 19. Principle
    The SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds.
    • GAPP 19.1 Subprinciple If investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed.
    • GAPP 19.2 Subprinciple The management of an SWF’s assets should be consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management principles.
  • GAPP 20. Principle
    The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with private entities.
  • GAPP 21. Principle
    SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments' value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights.
  • GAPP 22. Principle
    The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages the risks of its operations.
    • GAPP 22.1 Subprinciple The risk management framework should include reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the adequate monitoring and management of relevant risks within acceptable parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, business continuity planning, and an independent audit function.
    • GAPP 22.2 Subprinciple The general approach to the SWF’s risk management framework should be publicly disclosed.
  • GAPP 23. Principle
    The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the owner according to clearly defined principles or standards.
  • GAPP 24. Principle
    A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.
October 12, 2008

http://www.iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr0808.htm

Friday, October 3, 2008

Arab sovereign funds likely to buy US assets

Arab sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are likely to pounce on distressed US assets after the government bail-out plan eases the extraordinary tensions in financial markets, according to one of the top intermediaries in the Gulf.

Gary Long, president of Investcorp, the private equity group which channels petrodollars from some of the biggest private and institutional investors in the Gulf and invests them in western markets, said private investors and sovereign wealth funds were taking a different attitude to the Wall Street meltdown.

Wealthy private investors, "shell-shocked" by the crisis in the US financial system, were now expected to become more cautious and conservative. But institutions, including sovereign wealth funds, will be looking for opportunities.

"Institutional investors recognise that after a period of turmoil there will be a time when market opportunities will be great, so they are seeing what's happening as such a period," Long told the Financial Times.

"But it's hard to hide if you're a [private] investor. Every market is embattled: even the local stock markets, even real estate markets have been questioned. So private investors are going to be a little more conservative as opposed to chasing high returns," he added.

In recent weeks, the Middle East's SWFs, flush with oil-fuelled liquidity, have been remarkably quiet as some of the US financial stocks they had rushed to rescue over the past year were devastated by the global crisis.

Facing pressure at home, the $200 billion (Dh734 billion) Kuwait Investment Authority last week revealed that it had lost $270 million on its Citibank investment but recorded no losses on its investment in Merrill Lynch, which has been bought by Bank of America. The KIA had ploughed $5 billion into the two banks in January.

American institutions scouring the Gulf for capital have also been rebuffed, according to regional bankers.

Sovereign funds are not in the business of bailing out faltering banks, they were told, particularly at a time when they were under domestic pressure to intervene at home and shore up tumbling equity markets that were suffering from a spillover effect of the global turmoil.

Reasonable valuations

But people close to some of the region's sovereign wealth funds say that while they do not want to be seen as white knights, they are not sitting on the sidelines.

"Now the crisis is being dealt with, once that phase is mapped out, it will take years to bring back balance to the market and assets will be available at more reasonable valuations. So if you have cash it could be an interesting opportunity," says one person close to the $50 billion Qatar Investment Authority.

Long, meanwhile, said he expected sovereign wealth funds also to join hands with private equity firms in investing in distressed US assets. This year one Gulf fund set up a $1 billion partnership with Investcorp to buy mezzanine debt related to US commercial property.

"The bigger sovereign wealth funds have always had most of their investments through intermediaries," he said.

By Roula Khalaf, Financial Times

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Sunday, September 28, 2008

Sovereign funds steer clear of US deals

As the entire US investment banking industry seems to teeter on the brink of disaster, investors are asking: Where are the Middle East mega-funds, flush with oil money?

After all, less than a year ago, these funds happily invested billions of dollars for minority stakes in some of the biggest Wall Street names. And as oil approached $150 a barrel in July, Middle East sovereign wealth funds amassed even more cash for deals. But as venerable banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley slide, Middle East funds are keeping their distance.

The explanation is simple, bankers in the Middle East say: There are plenty of other, more attractive assets vying for the attention of these funds. While no one would rule out entirely the possibility that a Middle East fund will rescue Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley, it seems unlikely, they say.

Markets around the world have been hit by a downturn, said Youssef Nasr, chief executive of HSBC Bank Middle East, so there are compelling, value-priced deals available all over—sports teams in Britain, publicly traded companies in Russia and opportunities closer to home, like Middle East infrastructure acquisitions.

Middle East funds certainly got out their wallets this month—just not for Wall Street banks. A unit of the Kuwait Investment Authority is taking stakes in the country’s national telecommunications company. An Abu Dhabi investment fund owned by the royal family purchased the Manchester City Football Club, a popular soccer team. A Dubai fund is in talks with the British real estate developer Minerva. Saudi funds are looking at agricultural deals in Pakistan.

Because these funds have already invested billions of dollars in US financial institutions, they are less likely, not more likely, to put more cash into that sector right now, bankers say. Middle East sovereign wealth funds “put more money in a few months ago than they would have ideally done” because shares of financial institutions were relatively inexpensive then, Nasr said. That has “unbalanced” the portfolios of these sovereign wealth investors, he said.

“Now they need to go in the other direction,” he said, buying assets other than financial institutions, to diversify.

Jan Randolph, head of sovereign risk at Global Insight, an economic forecasting firm, said sovereign wealth funds “haven’t disappeared. They’ve remained on the sidelines or gone elsewhere”.

Middle East investors who were eager to seek stakes in financial companies a few quarters ago are staying away because the “magnitude of the crisis is much bigger than anyone thought,” Randolph said.

The sovereign wealth funds are also likely to be turned off by regulatory hurdles, political scrutiny and management issues.

Foreign purchases of US banks have attracted particular attention, ever since a scandal in 1991 involving the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, a bank based in Luxembourg that was seized in a coordinated action by regulators that year. BCCI had purchased stakes in US financial institutions without fully disclosing its involvement to regulators.

And none of the big sovereign wealth funds wants to engage in another bruising battle in the US Congress like the one that erupted when CNOOC of China tried to acquire UNOCAL in 2005. The US oil company went to Chevron.
Finally, the sovereign wealth funds generally have small staffs and have few people whom they could send to protect their interests in the event they took control of a major US investment bank.

Some sovereign wealth funds in Asia are still interested in US financial assets, though. The South Korean state-run fund, Korea Asset Management, for example, is hoping to buy nearly a billion dollars in nonperforming loans in the United States.

“The tables have turned,” the chief executive, Lee Chol Hwi, told Bloomberg News this week. Now Asian fund managers are coming to bail out US banks, the reverse of a decade ago, he said.

By Heather Timmons and Keith Bradsher